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Abstract. We build on two recent attempts to formalise reasoning with
dimensions which effectively map dimensions into factors. These enable
propositional reasoning, but sometimes a balance between dimensions
needs to be struck, and to permit trade offs we need to keep the magni-
tudes and so reason more geometrically. We discuss dimensions and val-
ues, arguing that values can play several distinct roles, both explaining
preferences between factors and indicating the purposes of the law.
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1. Introduction
Much work on reasoning with legal cases has been in terms of dimensions, intro-
duced in HYPO [6], and factors, developed from dimensions in CATO [5]. Fac-
tors are stereotypical patterns of facts, either present or absent in a case, and, if
present, favour either the plaintiff or the defendant. Dimensions, in contrast, are
ranges of values (numeric or enumerated), running from an extreme pro-plaintiff
point to an extreme pro-defendant point. The applicability of dimensions to a
case, and the point at which the case lies, is determined by the case facts, and the
dimension may favour either party. Most attention has been focussed on factors
and factor based reasoning was formalised by Horty [16] and refined by Rigoni in
[20]. A more detailed history of this line of development is given in [9]. More re-
cently it has been argued that factors fail to capture some of the nuances present
in legal Case Based Reasoning (CBR), and dimensions are needed to capture the
degree to which a party is favoured [4] and to bridge from factors to the facts of a
case (see[19] and [2]). This revival of interest has led to efforts by both Horty and
Rigoni to extend their formalisations of factor based reasoning to dimensions in
[15] and [21] respectively. Both Horty and Rigoni reduce dimensions to factors:
in this paper will we retain magnitudes for some dimensions.
This paper is a shortened version of [7]1 and will focus on the main contribu-
tions of that paper. We represent domain knowledge as an Abstract Dialectical
Framework (ADF) [13] as used in [3]. The key points are:
• Any legal CBR problem can be reduced to a series of steps involving at most
two dimensions, so that higher dimensional spaces need not be considered;
1Available at http://intranet.csc.liv.ac.uk/research/techreports/tr2017/ulcs-17-004.pdf. For
more context and detail see [7].
• The non-leaf nodes of the ADF can be seen as being one of five types, as
determined by their children. For some nodes dimensions cannot be reduced
to factors and need to retain their magnitude, to permit trade offs;
• Values are required to play several different roles, not just the expression
of preferences.
After a summary of [15] and [21], we discuss each of these points in turn.
2. Formalising Factors and Dimensions
The formalisations of factor-based reasoning of both Horty and Rigoni are based
on the method of expressing precedents as rules found in [18]. A case is considered
to be a triple 〈P,D, o〉, where P is the set of all pro-plaintiff factors present in
the case, D is the set of all pro-defendant factors present in the case and o is the
outcome, either plaintiff (pi) or defendant (δ). Now P → pi will be the strongest
reason to find for the plaintiff and D → δ will be the strongest reason the find for
the defendant. We can therefore deduce that either P  D or D  P depending
on the value of o. A key insight of Horty is that P → pi may be stronger than
is required and some subset of P may be sufficient to defeat D. The use of P
gives rise to what Horty terms the rule or result model and the subset the reason
model.
In [15] Horty uses precedents to map a dimension into a factor. The point
at which the factor becomes present depends on the facts of the case (result
model) or the tests given in the opinion (reason model), as determined by the
available precedents. However, as Horty shows, on this account the result and
reason models collapse and the reason does not provide an effective constraint
on subsequent decisions. Rigoni objects to these points and in [21] he avoids
both of them by mapping a dimension into several factors similar to [19], with
a point (the switching point (SP)) determined by the preferences at which the
factors cease to favour one side and begin to favour the other. SP may lie on,
or between, factors. Now reasons may be weaker than results in two ways: either
they may contain fewer factors as in [15], or they may contain weaker factors
from the same dimension. Rigoni also reconises that not all aspects of a case will
contain magnitude and so cases are a four-tuple of name, factors, dimensions and
outcome.
We regard Rigoni’s account as improving on Horty’s but claim that it cannot
deal with questions of balance and trade off [17]. To handle this magnitudes need
to be retained and the argumentation needs to become geometric as in [8] and
[7]. With one dimension we can think in terms of left and right (or greater and
less than), but with two dimensions we need to think in terms of north-west and
south-east of the various points. The facts of the case and its result define an area
where the decision must be followed, and the reason given offers a hypothetical
set of facts which creates an area that presumptively favours the winning side. A
new case may then fall into an area not yet covered by precedents and, depending
on the outcome, will claim some of the space for the winning side. Figure 2 of [7]
provides a relevant diagram.
3. How Many Dimensions Must we Consider?
In [8] the discussion was always in terms of two dimensions, but it was left open as
to whether higher dimensional spaces might require consideration. In fact, just as
any set of relations can be expressed in terms of binary relations and any k-SAT
problem can be expressed as 3-SAT, it is possible to represent any domain so as to
ensure that only two-dimensional spaces are needed. In [3] the ANGELIC method-
ology for representing domain knowledge as an Abstract Dialectical Framework
(ADF) [13] was presented. Formally an ADF forms a three tuple: a set of nodes, a
set of directed links joining pairs of nodes (a parent and its children), and a set of
acceptance conditions to determine the status of the nodes. The nodes represent
statements2, which, in this context relate to issues, intermediate factors and base
level factors, and acceptance conditions return a number between 0 and 1 repre-
senting the degree to which they favour the plaintiff. The links show which nodes
are used to determine the acceptability of other nodes, so that the degree of a
parent node is determined by its children. The acceptance condition for a node
states how precisely its children relate to that node. In [1] it was shown that such
an ADF could be rewritten as a 2-regular ADF, in which every non-leaf node has
at most two children. Since the degree to which a node favours the plaintiff de-
pends only on its children this means that we need never consider more than two
dimensions to resolve the acceptability of a node, and, since an ADF produced
by the ANGELIC methodology forms a tree, the topmost node can be resolved
without the need to consider more than two nodes at any given step.
4. Node Types
Like Rigoni, we recognise that not every aspect of a case requires representation
of magnitude. In the original HYPO [6] there were thirteen dimensions. For two
of these only one of the two extreme points was of interest; while for eight of
them both end points were of interest, but not any intermediate points. One di-
mension was a set of enumerable points and the remaining two were continuous
[9]. These four types represent a Horty style dimension, a pair of Rigoni-style fac-
tors, a Rigoni-style dimension and two irreducible dimensions requiring retention
of magnitude, respectively. Interpreting these respectively as single factors, pairs
of factors, sets of factors and dimensions, a given non-leaf node in our 2-regular
ADF (leaf nodes are instantiated from the case facts) may have as children:
1. two factors;
2Contrary to the assertions of the reviewers of the original submission, these statements are
not limited to two truth values. While originally in [13] they were presented as trivalent, later
they were generalised in [14]: “In an ADF, an argument is either accepted (t), rejected (f),
or undecided (u). We discuss how the ADF approach can be generalized to allow for more
fine-grained distinctions. We consider acceptance degrees taken form an arbitrary domain of
values possessing an adequate truth ordering and an information ordering. We show how to
accommodate such values using an adequate characteristic operator. We illustrate the approach
using degrees in the unit interval”. Nor is there, pace the reviewers, any difficulty in connecting
multi-valued statements with AND and OR. For example the techniques of fuzzy logic [22] could
be used: this was the approach applied to ADFs in [10].
2. one dimension and one factor;
3. two dimensions;
4. one factor (the other child is a dummy node, for example, true);
5. one dimension (the other child may be a threshold, allowing the dimension
to be coberted to a factor).
(1) is found in factor-based reasoning as formalised in [16] and [20]. In (2)
the factor provides a context for the consideration of a dimension. In the fiscal
domicile example discussed in [18], [15] and [21], citizenship may be a factor: if
the person is a UK citizen a longer absence may be required before a change is
made. Note that this aspect has no natural interpretation with magnitude: either
one is a UK citizen or not. In (3) we have the kind of trade off mentioned above.
The two dimensions describe points in a two dimensional space, and a line is
drawn separating the area favouring one outcome from the area favouring the
other outcome. Examples of (4) should be rare: the child can simply replace the
parent. Finally in (5) we have a way of implementing thresholds. Thus the parent
will be something like sufficient absence, and the purpose of the node is to provide
a means of converting a dimension into a factor, much as envisaged by Horty in
[16]. A set of such nodes, all with the actual point of the dimension as one child
and a threshold as the other, would produce the set of factors envisaged in [21]
and [19]. Thus only type (3) nodes will be resistant to the reduction to factors
suggested by both [15] and [21], and require the style of reasoning of [8].
5. Relation with Values
Now we can reintroduce a relationship with purposes or values. The idea of values
derives from [12] in which values were used to explain preferences between com-
peting factors, and hence to resolve conflicts for which there was no precedent in
terms of factors, as explained in detail in [11]. The existence of factors and dimen-
sions in case law domains is justified by their role in enabling the consideration
of the particular values the law is designed to promote. In [23] it was recognised
that values might play two roles: justifying the presence of a rule, or justifying
the inclusion of a particular antecedent in a rule.
In type (1) nodes, where the children are linked by AND, we ensure that
both values are promoted, and where they are linked by OR we ensure that at
least one of the values is promoted. Thus the role of nodes with two factors as
children linked by AND or OR is to ensure that required values are given their
due consideration. But there are also cases where the polarity of the two children
are different: effectively the connective can be read UNLESS. This expresses a
preference for the value associated with the exception. Note that only UNLESS
requires a preference: AND or OR consider both values to be of importance.
The second kind of node is where we have a factor providing a context for a
dimension. In the fiscal domicile example of [18] the length of absence might be
considered differently for different types of citizen. UK citizens might require a
longer absence than citizens of other countries who had been working here on a
long term, but not permanent, posting. Thus we may envisage a parent sufficient
given citizenship, with children UK citizen and absence. What we have here is
Figure 1. Possible trade off between absence and income percentage. The y-axis represents %
income earned in UK, so that increasing values of y favour no change
effectively two distinct dimensions with different SPs. Which is used depends on
whether the factor is present or not, and the applicable SPs will be specified
in the acceptance conditions. The value served here is stability, but the context
allows consideration of the value of mobility of labour, since we are allowing non-
UK citizens an easier path to restoring their original fiscal domicile. Thus we are
able to consider two values, or to consider what promotes a value in a particular
context. Similarly nodes of type (5) allow consideration of what is sufficient to
promote a value, but where the switching point at which the dimension becomes
sufficient is the same for all cases. This permits a threshold for a factor to be
determined by precedents, as envisaged in [15]: note that the different thresholds
can be applied by using environment variables as antecedents in the acceptability
conditions.
This leaves type (3), nodes with two genuine dimensions. Where they are
linked by AND or OR, the role of values is the same as for two factors. For exam-
ple, we can determine whether both sufficient absence (to promote stability) and a
sufficient degree of engagement (shown by the percentage of foreign earnings, and
promoting equity between countries) can be shown, so that the abstract factor
sufficient commitment can be seen as present in the case. AND and OR, can be
resolved using, for example, fuzzy logic style operators. Other type (3) nodes will
be those where a balance needs to be struck (see [17]) and so there is a trade off
between the dimensions. This is the situation considered in [8].
If we consider that the space can be divided by a single straight line we will
have an equation of the form: y = mx+c where m represents the slope of the line,
and hence the degree of trade off. Very often, however, m will not be the same for
all values of x : the amount of income required to trade off a year’s absence, may
change as absence increases. A fairly typical situation for absence and income
percentage in the fiscal domicile example is shown in Figure 1.
In Figure 1 we have a minimum absence and a minimum percentage of income,
with two different rates of trade off in between. To describe this we need a set of
four equations covering the various ranges: 0 ≤ x ≤ 12 : y = 0, 12 ≤ x ≤ 18 : y =
mx, 18 ≤ x ≤ 30 : y = nx (where n < m) and x ≥ 30 : y = 75.
The coefficient of x is important because it represents the degree of trade
off, the relative weight to be given to the different values at different points. In
Figure 1 we have sharp changes of slope, represented by a set of line segments, but
often there is a gradual and regular change, better represented by a curve rather
than a set of straight line segments, with the gradient varying as a function of
x. This function will determine whether the curve becomes increasingly steep or
increasingly shallow. In some cases we can imagine the curve changing direction
entirely: for a discussion of this point see [7].
In conclusion, we have discussed how we can extend [15] and [21] with dimen-
sions which cannot be reduced to sets of factors.
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